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FORGING AHEAD FROM FERGUSON: RE-EVALUATING
THE RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE IN THE FACE OF
POLICE MILITARIZATION
Ashley M. Eick*
Somewhere I read that the greatness of America is the right to protest
for right.1
—Martin Luther King, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
Stark images of protesters squaring off against police officers dominated the even-
ing news for several weeks in August 2014.2 For many around the world, it was almost
impossible to reconcile the pictures of police mounted on armored vehicles rolling
towards civilian protesters with modern American society.3 At the time, the images
appeared to be anything but twenty-first-century America; however, in the months that
followed the Ferguson unrest, police and protesters continued to clash throughout the
country.4 Baltimore burned;5 the Mall of America shut down;6 and New York City
traffic halted as thousands marched across the Brooklyn Bridge.7
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1 Martin Luther King, Jr., I’ve Been to the Mountaintop 3 (Apr. 3, 1968) (transcript available
at Wednesday, April 3, 1968, KING CTR., http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document
/I’ve-been-mountaintop-0# [http:perma.cc/PJV7-YH88]).
2 See, e.g., Michael Brown Protests in Pictures: Ferguson Police Use Tear Gas to Clear
Streets, TELEGRAPH, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/worldnews/11040522
/Michael-Brown-protests-in-pictures-Ferguson-police-use-tear-gas-to-clear-streets.html
(photo album).
3 See Adam Taylor & Rick Noack, How the Rest of the World Sees Ferguson, WASH. POST:
WORLDVIEWS (Aug. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp
/2014/08/18/how-the-rest-of-the-world-sees-ferguson/ [http://perma.cc/6E9A-662P] (“[T]he
chaotic situation in Ferguson, Mo., seems like something that shouldn’t happen in America.”).
4 See generally Alex Altman, Black Lives Matter, TIME, Dec. 2015, http://www.time
.com/time-person-of-the-year-2015-runner-up-black-lives-matter/ [http://perma.cc/EQ2E-39B9]
(explaining how the civil rights movement, Black Lives Matter, propelled a protest cry into
a political force in 2015).
5 See, e.g., Scott Shane, Baltimore Riots Are Another Scar on a City Long Battered by
Neglect, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/us/baltimore
-riots-are-another-scar-on-a-city-battered-by-neglect.html.
6 See, e.g., Christina Capecchi, ‘Black Lives Matter’ Protesters Gather; Mall Is Shut in
Response, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/24/us/black-lives
-matter-protesters-gather-mall-of-america-is-shut.html.
7 See, e.g., Oliver Laughland et. al, Eric Garner Protests Continue in Cities Across America
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Beyond the Black Lives Matter movement, several other national, attention-
drawing demonstrations also have ended with standoffs between police forces and
protesters.8 In 2003, police aggressively prohibited thousands of anti-war protesters
from even traveling to a rally in New York City.9 The Los Angeles Police Department
took full responsibility for injuring 246 journalists during a May Day immigration
rally in 2007.10 And, more recently, police physically evicted Occupy Wall Street pro-
testers from Zuccotti Park in 2011.11 Although the police are responsible for protecting
public safety, are they equally responsible for protecting constitutional rights? If they
are not, then who is? Who watches the watchmen?12
Founded on protest, revolution, and liberty,13 America has endorsed the freedoms
of speech, press, and assembly as bedrock values of our society.14 Protests, however,
do not easily fall within one of the delineated First Amendment buckets—they are
a combination of physical presence, symbolic speech, and verbal chants. As one of
Through Second Night, GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/05/eric
-garner-case-new-york-protests-continue-through-second-night [http://perma.cc/CJ4X-C89U]
(last updated Dec. 8, 2014, 6:00 AM).
8 See infra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
9 See Joyce Purnick, Metro Matters; The Right to Assemble Hits Detours, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 20, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/20/nyregion/metro-matters-the-right-to
-assemble-hits-detours.html (discussing potential barriers to the constitutionally protected
right to assemble during the February 15, 2003, anti-war protest in New York City). For a
detailed explanation of the protesters’ allegations against the police, see Shaila K. Dewan,
Protesters Say City Police Used Rough Tactics at Rally, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/19/nyregion/19RALL.html.
10 See Richard Winton & Duke Helfand, LAPD Takes Blame for Park Melee, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 10, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/10/local/me-melee10 [http://perma.cc/CG4B
-NG34] (critiquing the May 1, 2007, immigration rally in Los Angeles that ended in violence).
11 See Colleen Long & Verena Dobnik, Zuccotti Park Eviction: Police Arrest 200 Occupy
Wall Street Protesters, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/15/zuccotti
-park-eviction-po_n_1094306.html [http://perma.cc/3P44-9P6B] (last updated Jan. 14, 2012).
For a detailed explanation of the Occupy Wall Street movement, see Mattathias Schwartz, Pre-
Occupied: The Origins and Future of Occupy Wall Street, NEW YORKER, Nov. 28, 2011, http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/11/28/pre-occupied [http://perma.cc/MN9Q-35MG].
12 “Who watches the watchmen?” is a popular English translation of the Latin phrase
“Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” from Roman poet Juvenal in Satire VI. See, e.g., David
Isenberg, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG, http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/david-isenberg/quis-custodiet-ipsos-cust_b_595304.html [http://perma.cc/BFV2
-2CC2] (last updated May 25, 2011).
13 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“[W]hen a long train
of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce
[the people] under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such
Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.”).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.”).
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the most organic and effective avenues to demonstrate discontent, however, protests
are both intrinsic to American democracy and the natural products of exercising
one’s First Amendment rights.15
As such, the right to protest must be protected, especially as police tactics be-
come more aggressive due to militarization. Given the increased occurrence of public
protests,16 police forces must balance the protesters’ constitutional rights with the
police’s responsibility to ensure public safety. Recent events show how this balance
has sometimes fallen too heavily toward public order at the expense of First Amend-
ment freedoms.17 The presence of militarized police at public demonstrations can
create a chilling effect that unconstitutionally infringes upon individuals’ constitu-
tional rights of speech and assembly.
This Note argues that, in the face of police militarization, the right to assemble
must be re-evaluated and reclaimed as an affirmative constitutional right that pro-
tects public protests. Part I provides a brief history of police militarization in the
United States, explaining why it is a newfound threat to the right to assemble. Part
II analyzes how militarization affects public protests using the events of Ferguson
as a case study. Part III argues that the twentieth-century Supreme Court has misin-
terpreted the freedom of assembly by examining the historical origins of the Assem-
bly Clause. Finally, Part IV provides three different constitutional solutions for how
the Court may use the right to assemble to protect public protests from the negative
effects of police militarization.
I. THE HISTORY OF POLICE MILITARIZATION
A. Enacting the Posse Comitatus Act
Fearful of tyranny, the Founding Fathers outlined various fundamental rights
intended to prevent the United States from becoming a police state.18 Concerned that
15 See, e.g., Christopher Dunn, Balancing the Right to Protest in the Aftermath of
September 11, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 327, 328 (2005) (“The right to protest plays an
important role in free and democratic societies . . . . The significance of [this right] . . . is
reflected in its enshrinement in our Federal Constitution, most directly through the First
Amendment’s free speech, free press, and free exercise clauses.”).
16 See, e.g., J. Dana Stuster, Mapped: Every Protest on the Planet Since 1979, From
Cairo to Wall Street to the West Bank, Plotting a World of Upheaval, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Aug. 23, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/23/mapped-every-protest-on-the-planet
-since-1979/ [http://perma.cc/6U5X-PEEV] (mapping the monthly increase in number of
protests in the United States since 1979); see also GDELT Global Conflict Dashboard,
GDELT PROJECT, http://gdeltproject.org/globaldashboard/ (mapping the frequency of pro-
tests from August 2014 to February 2016).
17 See infra Part III.
18 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I (preventing Congress from making laws prohib-
iting the free exercise of religion, or restricting freedom of speech, press, or assembly); id.
amend. II (providing the “right of the people to keep and bear arms”); id. amend. III (forbidding
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a military force threatened basic fundamental liberties such as those outlined in the
First Amendment, New York proposed a distinct constitutional amendment that would
prohibit a standing army.19 Although this idea was discussed at length by Brutus in the
Anti-Federalist Papers,20 the prohibition against a standing army was not an included
safety valve. Nevertheless, scholars often point to the Third Amendment as proof of the
uneasiness that the Founding Fathers felt in regard to allowing military forces to en-
shroud themselves in local communities.21 Whether the Constitution allows for milita-
rized police forces, however, is irrelevant to this Note because the Posse Comitatus
Act has forbidden the use of the military to enforce domestic laws since 1878.22
During the 1876 election, President Grant utilized the United States Army to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.23 He stationed soldiers at polling locations to
protect blacks who voted.24 Southerners felt that the use of federal troops to super-
vise polls was “unlawful” and that their presence in the South was not only hostile,
but kept the wounds of the war open.25 In order to appease the Southern Democrats
after the contentious 1876 election, President Hayes agreed to end Reconstruction
and remove federal troops from the South in an informal deal now known as the
Compromise of 1877.26
the quartering of soldiers during peacetime in private houses); id. amend. IV (protecting
“against unreasonable searches and seizures”); id. amend. V (providing for a grand jury and
due process of law); id. amends. VI, VII (providing for jury trials); id. amend. VIII (pro-
tecting against “excessive fines” and “cruel and unusual punishments”); id. amends. IX, X
(reserving all other rights, unless prohibited, to the people).
19 Convention Debates and Proceedings, 17 July 1788, in 23 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 2191, 2201 (John P. Kaminski et al.
eds., 2009) [hereinafter N.Y. Convention Debates].
20 THE ANTI-FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 158–62 (Brutus) (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985)
(Storing attributed the Brutus essays to Robert Yates).
21 See generally Tom W. Bell, The Third Amendment: Forgotten but Not Gone, 2 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 117, 117 (1993) (explaining the historical origins of the Third Amendment);
Gordon S. Wood, Nat’l Constitution Ctr., Common Interpretation: The Third Amendment,
INTERACTIVE CONST., http://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amend
ment-iii [http://perma.cc/3AZU-2KHM] (discussing the British’s fear of a standing army).
22 Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 152 (1878) (“From and after the passage
of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States, as a
posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws . . . .”).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”).
24 See Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight
on 124 Years of Mischief and Misunderstanding Before Any More Damage Is Done, 175
MIL. L. REV. 86, 108–10 (2003) (“The President’s actions to supervise polling places during
the 1876 election were harshly criticized by many members of the democratically controlled
House in early 1877.”).
25 See id. at 100, 112–13.
26 See Tsahai Tafari, The Rise and Fall of Jim Crow—A National Struggle: The Congress,
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Wanting protection against the return of federal troops, congressional Southern
Democrats pushed through the Posse Comitatus Act.27 Although Southern Demo-
crats initially introduced the Act, Northern Democrats agreed with their southern
compatriots that the Act was an important legislative move for the country. Senator
Kernan from New York explained that “[i]t would be an entire overthrow . . . of a
fundamental principle of the laws of this country, of all our traditions, to . . . call a
body of the Army as a posse comitatus and order it about the polls of an election.”28
He went on to explain that such precedent could lead to the “entire overthrow of the
rights of citizens at the polls.”29
Since 1877, courts have interpreted the Posse Comitatus Act much broader than
Congress’s original intent to keep the army away from the polls. In modern jurispru-
dence, the Act “preclude[s] the Army from assisting local law enforcement officers”30
and “prevent[s] the direct active use of federal troops, one soldier or many, to exe-
cute the laws.”31 Such a strict standard is necessary because of the inherent danger
of the military to civilian freedom. Unlike the police, the military is “trained to operate
under circumstances where the protection of constitutional freedoms cannot receive
the consideration needed in order to assure their preservation.”32 The Founding Fathers,
Congress, and courts all seem to agree that the U.S. military, with all of its power,
should not execute civilian law.33 Instead, police officers who both work with local
communities and are trained to respect constitutional rights are charged with uphold-
ing civilian law.
B. The Modern Erosion of the Posse Comitatus Act
Although both the legislative history and the judicial interpretation of the Posse
Comitatus Act prohibit the comingling of military and police duties, this once
bright-line standard is beginning to blur in several ways due to the recent develop-
ment of police militarization. Police militarization is the increasingly common use
PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/struggle_congress.html [http://perma.cc/DQ2Y-TD3Q]
(explaining the connection between the 1876 election and the Compromise of 1877).
27 See Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir. 1948) (clarifying that the
immediate purpose of the Posse Comitatus Act was to prevent federal troops from policing
former Confederate states once civil order was restored), cert denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
28 7 CONG. REC. 4240 (1877) (statement of Sen. Kernan).
29 See id.
30 Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
31 United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 923 (D.S.D. 1975).
32 United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 193–94 (D.N.D. 1976).
33 See People v. Burden, 288 N.W.2d 392, 393 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979), rev’d, 303 N.W.2d
444 (1981) (holding that “the Posse Comitatus Act . . . prohibit[s] the use of military
personnel as agents for the enforcement of civil law”); State v. Nelson, 260 S.E.2d 629, 639
(N.C. 1979) (holding that “the Posse Comitatus Act . . . preclude[s] the direct active use of
federal troops in aid of execution of civilian laws”).
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of military-grade equipment and wartime tactics by local police departments, as
typically demonstrated by Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams.34
One way that local police forces are becoming militarized is through the ac-
quirement of military-appropriated materials. In 1989, Congress expanded the role
of the Department of Defense in the national “war on drugs.”35 This expansion included
the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act,36 which gave the U.S. Department of
Defense permission to “transfer excess property to federal and state law enforcement
agencies.”37 From this Act, Congress developed the 1033 Program, whereby law
enforcement agencies both review excess Department of Defense property and
submit requests for that property along with a description of its intended use.38
Currently, more than 8,000 federal and state law enforcement agencies actively
participate in the program, and more than $5.1 billion worth of property has been pro-
vided to those agencies since 1990.39 Just in 2011 and 2012, it is “estimated that an
[sic] 63 police departments received 500 Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles
[(MRAPs)],” which “were designed to defeat enemy roadside bombs in Afghanistan
and Iraq.”40 The Pentagon also gave “435 other armored vehicles, 533 aircraft and
nearly 94,000 machine guns” to police departments.41 In assigning these resources,
the Department of Defense neither evaluated true need42 nor required local officials
to receive any training on how or when to use such specialized military equipment.43
34 See, e.g., Paul D. Shinkman, Ferguson and the Militarization of Police, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/08/14/ferguson-and-the-shocking
-nature-of-us-police-militarization [http://perma.cc/G9YR-X8TH] (last updated Aug. 14,
2014). For an extensive history of police militarization in the United States, see RADLEY BALKO,
RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES (2013).
35 See Oversight of Federal Programs for Equipping State and Local Law Enforcement
Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th
Cong. 3 (2014) (statement of Hilary O. Shelton, Washington Bureau Director & Senior Vice
President for Advocacy, NAACP) (explaining the history and impact of the 1033 Program).
36 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104
Stat. 1485 (1990).
37 Oversight of Federal Programs for Equipping State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 1 (2014)
[hereinafter Statement of Alan Estevez] (statement of Alan Estevez, Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics, U.S. Dep’t of Defense).
38 See id. (explaining how the 1033 Program works).
39 See id. at 3.
40 See Mark Thompson, Why Ferguson Looks So Much Like Iraq, TIME (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://www.time.com/3111455/ferguson-missouri-michael-brown-iraq/ [http://perma.cc/KCV5
-BAX6] (detailing the extent of police militarization in the United States).
41 See id.
42 See Statement of Alan Estevez, supra note 37, at 3–5 (“Law enforcement agencies deter-
mine their need for types of equipment and they determine how it is used. The Department
of Defense does not have expertise in police force functions and cannot assess how equipment
is used in the mission of an individual law enforcement agency.” (emphasis added)).
43 See Oversight of Federal Programs for Equipping State and Local Law Enforcement
Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th
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The distinction between the military and police is also being blurred through the
increasingly common use of SWAT teams. Police SWAT teams were first created after
the 1965 Watts Riots for use in exceptional emergencies such as domestic terror and
hostage situations.44 In the last two decades, however, there has been a 1,500% increase
in the use of SWAT teams.45 An ACLU study even found that nearly 80% of SWAT
team raids are comprised of drug-related warrant searches.46 SWAT teams also are no
longer unique to large urban areas; 80% of small towns now have a SWAT team.47
Because most of these small towns have no other special forces team, they deploy
the local SWAT teams whenever special forces are needed even to peaceful events
such as protests.48
Finally, police militarization goes beyond just equipment and the increased use
of SWAT teams. Police militarization is unintentionally changing the fundamental
nature of how civilian police officers interact with community members, especially
marginalized populations who already distrust police officers.49 Some police forces
are even wearing military-style uniforms on the streets.50 One scholar argues that the
“[m]ilitary gear and garb changes . . . reinforce[] a war fighting mentality among
civilian police, where marginalized populations become the enemy and the police
perceive of themselves as the thin blue line between order and chaos that can only
be controlled through military model power.”51
The majority of police academies are also modeled after military basic training
programs with a warrior-like orientation to policing.52 Scholars have argued that this
Cong. 5 (2014) [hereinafter Statement of Mark Lomax] (statement of Mark Lomax, Executive
Director, National Tactical Officers Association) (arguing that special operation forces need
extra training).
44 See Rosa Brooks, Essay, The Trickle-Down War, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 583,
589–90 (2014) (citing BALKO, supra note 34) (discussing how domestic policing has become
militarized).
45 Al Baker, When the Police Go Military, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2011), http://www.ny
times.com/2011/12/04/sunday-review/have-american-police-become-militarized.html.
46 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF
AMERICAN POLICING (2014) https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/jus14
-warcomeshome-text-rel1.pdf [http://perma.cc/F8FA-FP6W].
47 See Oversight of Federal Programs for Equipping State and Local Law Enforcement
Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th
Cong. 3 (2014) [hereinafter Statement of Peter B. Kraska] (statement of Peter B. Kraska,
Professor & Chair of Graduate Studies and Research, School of Justice Studies, Eastern
Kentucky University) (detailing the history of police militarization).
48 See Statement of Mark Lomax, supra note 43 (“There is also a general lack of training,
regarding civil disorder events, for tactical commanders, planners, public information officers
and first line supervisors.”).
49 See Statement of Peter B. Kraska, supra note 47.
50 Brooks, supra note 44, at 590–91 (discussing how domestic policing has become
militarized).
51 Statement of Peter B. Kraska, supra note 47.
52 See The COPS Office, Recruit Training: Are We Preparing Officers for a Community Ori-
ented Department?, 6 CMTY. POLICING DISPATCH (2013), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/html
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style of training produces police tactics that are “contrary to democratic governance”
and community policing.53 Instead of learning how to problem solve and work with
community members, police officers focus on the “action-oriented aspects” of the
job.54 The Chicago Police Department even runs an off-the-books interrogation site,
Homan Square, that is the “domestic equivalent of a CIA black site.”55 Although the
Chicago Police Department maintains that the site is not a secret facility, the U.S.
Department of Justice has launched an investigation into whether the police depart-
ment has habitually violated the Constitution in recent years.56
Although both the military and the police serve and protect our communities,
their respective roles in doing so are vastly different. Soldiers go to war, whereas police
officers maintain the peace. In some circumstances, police militarization has simply
gone too far. Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act to control the inherent threat
that the military poses to domestic society.57 By wearing military fatigues, operating
black sites, deploying SWAT teams for every and any reason, some domestic police
forces have become a de facto military power. Conflating the distinct roles that the
military and police serve has devastating consequences to American civil liberties, es-
pecially given the increased use of public protests as an outlet for political expression.
II. POLICE MILITARIZATION’S CHILLING EFFECT ON THE RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE
The most poignant way to assess how police militarization has affected the
constitutional right to assemble is through a case study of the Ferguson protests that
occurred during the summer of 2014. Of all the recent protests, Ferguson certainly
has both led to the most debate on current policing tactics and served as an example
of how not to respond to spontaneous public demonstrations.58 The Department of
/dispatch/06-2013/preparing_officers_for_a_community_oriented_department.asp [http:// perma
.cc/L5EH-BCS2] (detailing the differences between community policing and warrior policing).
53 Norman Conti, Weak Links and Warrior Hearts: A Framework for Judging Self and
Others in Police Training, 12 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 410, 411 (2011) (citing Michael L. Birzer
& Ronald Tannehill, A More Effective Training Approach for Contemporary Policing, 4
POLICE Q. 233 (2001)) (analyzing how police training affects community policing).
54 See The COPS Office, supra note 52.
55 Spencer Ackerman, The Disappeared: Chicago Police Detain Americans at Abuse-
Laden ‘Black Site,’ GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/feb/24/chicago
-police-detain-americans-black-site [http://perma.cc/HB35-28UH] (last updated Mar. 4, 2015,
12:29 PM); see also Spencer Ackerman & Zach Stafford, Chicago Police Detained Thou-
sands of Black Americans at Interrogation Facility, GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2015/aug/05/homan-square-chicago-thousands-detained [http://perma.cc/5LPC
-P39P] (last updated Aug. 6, 2015, 7:38 AM) (asserting that Chicago police have detained
3,500 Americans at Homan Square).
56 See Dana Ford et al., Chicago’s Homan Square Police Complex Under Fire, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/15/us/chicago-homan-square-hearing/ [http://perma.cc/FFZ9
-XDY3] (last updated Dec. 22, 2015, 2:42 PM).
57 See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.
58 Associated Press in Wash., Police in Ferguson Gave a Lesson in How Not to Respond
to Protests, Says Report, GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2015, 7:11 PM), http://www.theguardian.com
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Justice’s Office of Community Orienting Policing Services released an in-depth report
criticizing Ferguson’s police response to the demonstration, encouraging other police
forces to learn from the events of Ferguson.59
A. What Happened in Ferguson?
On Saturday, August 9, 2014, a police officer fatally shot eighteen-year-old
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.60 Throughout that evening, groups formed in
protest at the location of the shooting.61 Over one hundred police officers responded
to the scene with assault rifles and a SWAT vehicle.62
Over the next few days, the protesters failed to quiet down and unrest continued
to spill over into the streets. On Sunday, August 10, 2014, hundreds of police of-
ficers in military fatigues with K-9 units, rifles, and shields monitored a candlelight
vigil.63 As the night wore on, the protests turned violent when a group of rioters looted
local stores, smashed the windows of a gas station, and attacked police vehicles.64
On Monday night, there was a standoff between a dozen residents and a dozen
officers who were outfitted in full riot gear.65 The protesters refused to leave, repeat-
edly chanting “Don’t shoot, my hands are up.”66 The police, moving down the main
road toward residences, sprayed tear gas and shot rubber bullets at the demonstrators.67
The clash lasted for hours until the protesters were forced home.68
/us-news/2015/sep/02/police-ferguson-response-justice-department-report [http://perma.cc
/L5YP-39VD].
59 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., AFTER-ACTION
ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICE RESPONSE TO THE AUGUST 2014 DEMONSTRATIONS IN FERGUSON,
MISSOURI 117 (2015) [hereinafter DOJ REPORT], http://www.ric-zai-inc.com/Publications
/cops-p317-pub.pdf. Neither the report nor this Note seeks to deride the Ferguson police for
their action during an unprecedented and chaotic time and commend the police for sharing
their experiences and rationale behind their actions in the days of the unrest to “prevent
potential police-community conflicts from occurring” in the future. Id.
60 See Michael Brown Shooting: Anger at Crackdown on Protests, BBC NEWS (Aug. 14,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-28781440 [http://perma.cc/2NPM-DZ2T].
61 See Eliott C. McLaughlin, Fatal Police Shooting in Missouri Sparks Protests, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/10/justice/missouri-police-involved-shooting/index.html
[http://perma.cc/NUN5-Z4ZF] (last updated Aug. 11, 2014, 12:13 AM).
62 See id.
63 See Julie Bosman & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Grief and Protests Follow Shooting of a
Teenager, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/us/police-say
-mike-brown-was-killed-after-struggle-for-gun.html.
64 See id.
65 See Wesley Lowery, Police Use Tear Gas on Crowd in Ferguson, Mo., Protesting Teen’s
Death, WASH. POST: POST NATION (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/post-nation/wp/2014/08/12/police-use-tear-gas-on-crowd/ [http://perma.cc/XST3-UGJS].
66 See id.
67 See id.
68 See id.
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Tensions remained high that Tuesday, leading to another explosive night that
Wednesday. During altercations, journalists fled to a nearby McDonald’s to report
and work from their laptops.69 The police’s SWAT team invaded the restaurant, and
demanded that the reporters leave and stop videotaping them.70 The police took two
reporters into custody when they failed to leave the building.71 Police officers also
threw tear gas and shot rubber bullets at the protesters and reporters outside.72 Ryan
Reilly, a Huffington Post reporter who was detained in the McDonald’s, was
identified as saying that “the police resembled soldiers more than officers, and
treated those inside the McDonald’s as ‘enemy combatants.’”73
B. The Effect of Militarized Police on the Ferguson Protests
Police militarization allowed the Ferguson police officers to respond to a potential
peaceful protest with “military weaponry not often seen on city streets in the United
States.”74 The Department of Defense’s 1033 Program provided St. Louis County
police departments with “6 pistols, 12 rifles, 15 weapons sights, 1 explosive ord-
nance disposal robot, 3 helicopters, 7 [humvees], and 2 night vision devices.”75 The
police not only used military equipment that would “normally [be] seen on the national
news during conflicts in Middle East war zones,”76 but also wore military fatigues
and used other military equipment before violence had even occurred.77 Rather than
providing a sense of protection to the protesters, the police’s presence in such gear
69 See Brian Stelter, Journalists Covering Michael Brown Shooting Say They Were Arrested,
CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/13/justice/missouri-teen-shooting-journalists/ [http://perma
.cc/P54R-BQQJ] (last updated Aug. 14, 2014, 3:20 PM).
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See Catherine Taibi, Ferguson Police Use Tear Gas on Al Jazeera America Team,
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/14/al-jazeera-ferguson-tear-gas
-journalists_n_5678081.html [http://perma.cc/LH3A-EVS5] (last updated Aug. 14, 2014).
73 Ryan Grim, Statement on the False Arrest of Reporters Ryan Reilly and Wesley
Lowery, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/13/ryan-reilly-_n_5677
060.html [http://perma.cc/Y8XZ-EWXV] (last updated Aug. 14, 2014).
74 Oversight of Federal Programs for Equipping State and Local Law Enforcement
Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th
Cong. (2014) [hereinafter Statement of Wiley Price] (statement of Wiley Price, Photo-
journalist, St. Louis American).
75 Statement of Alan Estevez, supra note 37.
76 Statement of Wiley Price, supra note 74.
77 See Oversight of Federal Programs for Equipping State and Local Law Enforcement
Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong.
(2014) [hereinafter Statement of Sen. McCaskill] (statement of Sen. Claire McCaskill,
Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs) (“I heard reports from my
constituents about aggressive police actions being used against protesters, well before any
violence occurred.”).
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“only escalated the understandably strong feelings felt by the very people police are
sworn to serve and protect.”78 Senator McCaskill of Missouri explained that “[o]fficers
dressed in military fatigues will not be viewed as partners in any community. Armored
military vehicles, even if they are painted black and used with the utmost discretion
are, by definition, intimidating.”79 As another scholar put it, “Ferguson was defined,
in part, by the way in which militarized police behaved like soldiers in a war zone
and reacted to potentially peaceful assembly accordingly.”80 When officers treat all
protesters as enemy combatants, even the peaceful protestors’ constitutional rights
are at risk.81
Although the Department of Justice’s report points to a number of decisions that
intensified hostility between the police and protesters, the report both reaffirms the
testimony provided at the congressional hearings and highlights the role that mili-
tarization played in escalating the situation. The report found that “[t]he use of tactical
units [such as SWAT teams] . . . can undermine the police’s peacekeeping role . . .
[and] can anger and frighten citizens, resulting in greater animosity toward the
police, which in turn may fuel more conflict.”82 The report also encourages police
forces to restrict the use of “military-style uniforms, equipment, weapons, and armored
vehicles . . . to limited situations that clearly justify their use.”83 Finally, the report
determined that the widespread use of sniper rifles, visible use of armored vehicles,
and initial use of tactical equipment was inappropriate.84
Although the Ferguson protests shocked the nation, many scholars predicted that
the increasing militarization of police at public demonstrations would eventually
explode. First Amendment scholar Timothy Zick anticipated that militarization tactics
against protesters would eventually “backfire,” “reduce public goodwill toward authori-
ties,” and lead to “escalated disruption” of public events,85 which is exactly what oc-
curred in Ferguson. Likewise, Timothy Lynch from the Cato Institute indicated that
the extensive proliferation of militarization in local police forces may eventually create
more confrontations with citizens.86
78 Statement of Wiley Price, supra note 74.
79 Statement of Sen. McCaskill, supra note 77.
80 Howard Wasserman, Inevitable Conflict and the State of the First Amendment, PRAWFS
BLAWG (Nov. 17, 2014, 8:34 PM), http://www.prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/11
/inevitable-conflict-and-the-state-of-the-first-amendment.html [http://perma.cc/N3JV-WNQC].
81 See Timothy Zick, Zick on Public Protest and Ferguson, PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov. 20,
2014, 5:18 PM), http://www.prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/11/zick-on-public
-protest-and-ferguson.html [http://perma.cc/B2C7-7N9G] (“When officers divide streets into
military-style grids and gird for battle, even peaceful protesters and reporters are at risk.”).
82 DOJ REPORT, supra note 59, at 124.
83 Id. at 124 (emphasis omitted).
84 Id. at 124–25.
85 TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES
IN PUBLIC PLACES 254–55 (2009).
86 Baker, supra note 45 (quoting Timothy Lynch).
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By increasing the personal costs of gathering during protests through intimi-
dation tactics,87 militarized police are infringing on citizens’ constitutional right to
assemble. Aggressive police tactics are especially intimidating when occurring in
a heightened social environment such as Ferguson.88 Police forces are composed of
ordinary individuals who are susceptible to the same prejudices and biases as
everyone else; these biases often lead to a mental shortcut that “complicates the
relationship between police and the communities they serve.”89 Ferguson’s popula-
tion is 67% black, yet there were only three black police officers on a force of fifty-
three people.90 In communities where a “gulf of mistrust” exists between the police
officers and local citizens, police forces must be especially cognizant of the image
that they portray to the community at times of protest.91 Through their reactions to
public demonstrations, militarized police forces are effectively operating as “the
social control of dissent,” deciding which protests have merit and are allowed to
continue and which ones should be suppressed.92
III. RE-EVALUATING THE ASSEMBLY CLAUSE
Under the current interpretation of the Assembly Clause, there is little recourse
for citizens who have been deterred from the streets by militarized police. In modern
87 After tear gas and rubber bullets were fired near the Al Jazeera America crew, the news
organization released a statement saying that the conduct was “clearly intended to have a
chilling effect on [their] ability to cover [the Ferguson events].” Kate O’Brian, Statement
from the President, AL JAZEERA AM. (Aug. 14, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/tools
/pressreleases/statement.html [http://perma.cc/3M9X-96TP]; see also Taibi, supra note 72.
88 See DOJ REPORT, supra note 59, at 116 (detailing the lack of relationship between
much of the community of Ferguson and the police department).
89 James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hard Truths: Law
Enforcement and Race (Feb. 12, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.fbi.gov/news
/speeches/hard-truths-law-enforcement-and-race [http://perma.cc/UT9J-CY2Y]).
90 See Paulina Firozi, 5 Things to Know About Ferguson Police Department, USA TODAY
(Aug. 19, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/08/14
/ferguson-police-department-details/14064451/ [http://perma.cc/Y8TR-GREF].
91 President Obama discussed the relationship between police officers and minorities in
an address to the nation: “[I]n too many communities around the country, a gulf of mistrust exists
between local residents and law enforcement. In too many communities, too many young men
of color are left behind and seen only as objects of fear.” President Barack Obama, Remarks on
Iraq and Ferguson (Aug. 18, 2014) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov
/photos-and-video/video/2014/08/18/president-speaks-iraq-and-ferguson#transcript
[http://perma.cc/TD99-TAL2]). New York City Police Department Commissioner William
J. Bratton also explained that police officers need to accept responsibility for the role their
profession played in enforcing slavery and Jim Crow laws. See J. David Goodman, Bratton
Says New York Police Officers Must Fight Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www
.nytimes.com/2015/02/25/nyregion/new-yorks-police-commissioner-says-officers-must-fight
-bias.html (“Many of the worst parts of black history would have been impossible without
police . . . .” (quoting Commissioner William J. Bratton)).
92 ZICK, supra note 85, at 242.
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jurisprudence, the Assembly Clause does not grant a distinct right for in-person
demonstrations, but works jointly with the Freedom of Expression Clause to grant
the right of association.93 The type of public protest like that which occurred in
Ferguson is not an associational concern, nor does it appear to be a wholly free
speech concern either. Although the Supreme Court has frequently used the Free
Speech Clause to analyze public protests,94 the existing constitutional jurisprudence
fails to reach the heart of what is at issue—the physical protest. The time, place, and
manner doctrine established under the Free Speech Clause grants localities a wide
berth of power to regulate public demonstrations, but it fails to address the intimida-
tion tactics that are chilling protesters’ constitutional right to be physically present
during the public demonstration.
Despite its current incarnation, the Founding Fathers viewed the right to as-
semble as an individual right—one that is distinct from the freedoms of speech and
association—that protected in-person, active gatherings of individuals just like the
recent public protests.95 In arguing the original intent of the Assembly Clause, we
should “carry ourselves back to the time when the constitution was adopted, recol-
lect the spirit manifested in the debates, and instead of trying what meaning may be
squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, conform to the probable one in which
it was passed.”96
First, there is the most obvious fact that the Founding Fathers would not have
included the Assembly Clause if it were merely a reiteration of the Free Speech
93 The Court first enunciated the freedom of association with NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), in an effort to protect the NAACP’s membership list from
Alabama’s confiscation. Because the freedom of association was not explicitly delineated
as a First Amendment right, the Court combined the freedoms of speech and assembly. Id.
at 460 (“Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly con-
troversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than
once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and
assembly.”). As southern states continued to attack the NAACP during the Civil Rights
Movement, the freedom of assembly was subsumed by the freedom of association. See John
D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 566 (2010); Nicholas
S. Brod, Note, Rethinking a Reinvigorated Right to Assemble, 63 DUKE L.J. 155, 159 (2013).
94 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) (“We emphatically reject the notion . . .
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who
would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and
highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.”);
Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, in THE LAW OF DISSENT AND RIOTS 319, 319 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 1971) (“[I]t is generally recognized that demonstrations are within First Amend-
ment protection.”).
95 See GLENN ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 11–13 (4th ed.
1961) (explaining that there was general acceptance to the right of assembly at the First
Congress).
96 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in 12 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: CORRESPONDENCE AND PAPERS1816–1826, at 251, 254 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., 1905), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/808.
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Clause. In fact, there was debate over whether the Assembly Clause was superflu-
ous. Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts wanted to remove the Assembly Clause
because it was “a self-evident unalienable right which the people possess.”97 He felt
that if the freedom of speech was recognized, then the freedom of assembly was
obviously recognized as well, and to include that separately would be pejorative and
trivial.98 Six other delegates disagreed with Sedgwick, however, arguing that, even
if the right to assemble appeared to be inherent, it was of such importance that it should
be expressly provided to ensure against government infringement.99 As Mr. Page put
it, if a person is deprived of the freedom of assembly, then he can be deprived of any
freedom.100 Furthermore, several state constitutions included the Clause, and Virginia
and North Carolina expressly advised the Convention to include it.101
The debate over the inclusion of the Assembly Clause also must take into ac-
count that the First Congress met in the shadow of Shay’s Rebellion, a fact that
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts alluded to during the debate.102 Shay’s Rebellion
was an armed uprising in 1786 that was one of the catalysts for the Constitutional
Convention.103 Gerry encouraged the inclusion of the freedom of assembly, despite
its abuse by those involved in Shay’s Rebellion.104 Sedgwick’s motion to abandon
the Assembly Clause was defeated by a majority.105
In addition to the legislative history, the language of the Assembly Clause also
demonstrates the Founding Fathers’ intent to protect public protests. The founding-
era meaning of “to assemble” is similar to our current understanding. It was under-
stood to be a group of individuals getting together for face-to-face meetings.106 The
textual meaning has nothing to do with associational relationships or speech that the
Court imparts on the clause today. Moreover, every other time the word “assemble”
is used in the Constitution, it always refers to an in-person meeting, typically in a
temporal nature.107
The right to assemble must also be broadly interpreted, because the final draft
of the First Amendment removes the phrase “for the common good” after “to
97 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
98 Id.
99 Id. (Mr. Benson, Mr. Tucker, Mr. Gerry, Mr. Page, Mr. Vining, and Mr. Hartley all argued
to keep the clause as is).
100 Id.
101 Id.; see also Baylen J. Linnekin, “Tavern Talk” and the Origins of the Assembly Clause:
Tracing the First Amendment’s Assembly Clause Back to Its Roots in Colonial Taverns, 39
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 593, 611–12 (2011).
102 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
103 See NEIL A. HAMILTON, REBELS AND RENEGADES: A CHRONOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL DISSENT IN THE UNITED STATES 55–56 (2002).
104 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 759 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
105 Id.
106 See Brod, supra note 93, at 164 (analyzing the textual understanding of the right to
assemble).
107 See id. at 164–65.
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assemble.” Both Madison’s and New York’s original resolution include the phrase
“for their common good,”108 yet there was no mention of why or when this phrase
was dropped.109 Even if the drop was an accident, removal of the “common good”
language means that citizens enjoy the right to peaceably assemble for any reason,
not just for their common good.110
Finally, looking at the types of assemblies that occurred during the revolutionary
era, it is clear that protests were just as chaotic and passionate then as they are now. As
such, recent public protests fit into the same category of assemblies that the Founding
Fathers experienced and sought to protect. During the revolutionary era, Americans reg-
ularly assembled in the streets to discuss public questions and demonstrate dissent.111
Often, these “assemblies” would disrupt economic activity and block public roads, yet
they were not considered uprisings, rather legitimate political activity.112
Although these protests tended to be peaceful, it was not uncommon for public
officials to be targeted for tarring and feathering or private property to be damaged.113
For example, in response to the Stamp Act of 1765, John Adams led a group of pro-
testers to the Liberty Tree outside of Boston, hoisted an effigy of the city’s tax collec-
tor, decapitated and burned it, and then attacked the collector’s home.114 When
viewed in retrospect, even the Boston Tea Party was incredibly hostile.115
The intellectual elite who went on to write the First Amendment not only tolerated
these demonstrations, but also generally supported them.116 Thomas Jefferson once
wrote to James Madison that “a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as
necessary in the political world as storms in the physical.”117
108 Madison’s Resolution for Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), CONSOURCE,
http://www.consource.org/document/madisons-resolution-for-amendments-to-the-constitution
-1789-6-8/ [http://perma.cc/W7VX-ZQUQ]; N.Y. Convention Debates, supra note 19.
109 See Inazu, supra note 93, at 571–73.
110 See id. at 571.
111 See ZICK, supra note 85, at 26.
112 See Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 730–31 (2002).
113 See generally Benjamin H. Irvin, Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies of American
Liberties, 1768–1776, 76 NEW ENG. Q. 197 (2003).
114 Nat’l Constitution Ctr. Staff, The Seeds of Revolution: The Stamp Act Protests in Boston,
NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (Mar. 22, 2015), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2015
/03/the-seeds-of-revolution-the-stamp-act-protests-in-boston/ [http://perma.cc/85V6-NGZX];
see also 1 REVOLTS, PROTESTS, DEMONSTRATIONS, AND REBELLIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY:
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 131–32 (Steven L. Danver ed., 2011).
115 In December of 1773, several thousand Bostonians assembled in the streets to protest
the unloading of tea from a British merchant ship. See HAMILTON, supra note 103, at 55–56.
When the Massachusetts Governor refused to meet with a colonial representative, a small
group of revolutionaries climbed on board and threw 342 chests of tea into Boston Bay, all
while a large crowd watched and protected the law breakers. See id.
116 See ZICK, supra note 85, at 27.
117 ZICK, supra note 85 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 30,
1787), in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 414 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975)).
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Even after the Revolutionary War, public protests were an expected part of
everyday life.118 Many felt that it was not only their right to protest, but also their
duty, especially when no other political recourse was available. As Justice Brandeis
eloquently wrote in his famous concurrence from Whitney v. California:119
Those who won our independence believed that the . . . free-
dom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile;
that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of
the American government.120
Like today, public demonstrations in the revolutionary period provided a
political outlet for the common man.121 It provided an accessible channel for those
in the minority to demonstrate their outrage with the system and draw attention to
their concerns. The spontaneity and widespread disruption of everyday life drew
attention to the people who had few other avenues to demand change. One scholar
noted that public mobbing “was a means by which ordinary people, usually those
most dependent—women, servants, free blacks, sailors, and young men—made their
power felt temporarily in a political system that was otherwise largely immune to
their influence.”122 It was a way for the people “to bring wayward government to
heel.”123 Despite the overwhelming evidence that the Founding Fathers intended for
the Assembly Clause to be a cornerstone of constitutional protection, we have
reached a point in modern jurisprudence where the right to assemble has not formed
the basis of a Supreme Court opinion for thirty years.124 And, in an era where in-
person public protests are continuously threatened by state intimidation in the form
of police militarization, there is a serious gap in the constitutional protection of
physical gatherings.
118 See ZICK, supra note 85, at 26 (stating that “[p]eople tended to spend substantial por-
tions of their days in public places” and people appeared in streets as assemblies).
119 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
120 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
121 See ZICK, supra note 85, at 27 (explaining that social movements in the revolutionary
period were necessary to have a voice in the political process).
122 ZICK, supra note 85, at 30 (quoting GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC: 1776–1787, at 319–28 (1969)).
123 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 26 (1998).
124 See Brod, supra note 93, at 160.
2016] FORGING AHEAD FROM FERGUSON 1251
IV. USING THE RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE TO ATTACK THE PRESENCE OF
MILITARIZED POLICE AT PUBLIC PROTESTS
There are three different ways that the Court can revitalize the Assembly Clause to
prevent the chilling effect of police militarization on public protest: (1) the Court can
roll back its interpretation of the Assembly Clause to the Framers’ original intent
using existing principles of stare decisis; (2) the Court can apply the chilling effect
doctrine to actions that deter citizens from exercising the right to assemble; or (3) the
Court can shift the burden of ensuring a protest remains peaceful to the police.
A. Interpreting the Freedom of Assembly Through Originalism
Despite the current interpretation of the Assembly Clause that treats the freedom
of assembly as an ancillary right to the freedom of association, the Supreme Court
once correctly interpreted the Clause as the Framers originally intended—a protec-
tion of in-person public protests and dissident political thought. In De Jonge v.
Oregon,125 the Court incorporated the freedom of assembly and held that De Jonge
had a constitutional right to speak at a peaceful assembly, even if he spoke of commu-
nist revolution.126 The Court explained that, even though the right of assembly is
susceptible to abuse, state action must target that abuse rather than the right itself.127
The freedom of assembly must be protected against government infringement “in
order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion” and to ensure that the
“government [continues to] be responsive to the will of the people.”128 The Court
even went so far as to say that “the very foundation of constitutional government”
lies in ensuring that the government does not prevent a citizen’s right to assemble.129
Protests, and public assemblies, are such an effective means of political speech
because they attract widespread news coverage and can create a disruptive, yet visi-
ble disturbance to everyday life.130 For those with minority opinions, a protest may be
the only avenue to publicize a message and mobilize support in other parts of the
country.131 The Court itself has pointed out that speech “may indeed best serve its
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.”132 Applying this reasoning to
125 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
126 See id. at 364–66.
127 See id. at 364–65 (“The people through their legislatures may protect themselves
against that abuse. . . . The rights themselves must not be curtailed.”).
128 Id. at 365.
129 Id.
130 See Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, supra note 94, at 319.
131 See id.
132 Id. at 320–21 (emphasis added) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
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Ferguson, the black community of Ferguson was able to shine a light on race issues
that mainstream society largely ignores by demonstrating in the streets. Nothing in
recent memory has brought more attention to the intrinsic prejudices in our legal
system or started a national movement like the events in Ferguson. To allow police
militarization to chill the freedom of assembly ignores the rationale behind the right
that both the Founding Fathers and the Court have articulated.
Two years after De Jonge, the Court announced, in Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization,133 another rationale for protecting a broad interpretation of
the assembly clause—impartiality. In Hague, the Court struck down under the First
and Fourteenth Amendment an ordinance that allowed a state actor to deny a permit
for a public demonstration if he or she felt that such denial would prevent “riots,
disturbances or disorderly assemblage.”134 The Court was extremely worried that
such an ordinance would allow local officials to arbitrarily decide which views were
sanctioned and which were oppressed, as all public assemblies would potentially
cause disturbances.135
This same rationale applies to the public protests of today; instead of having a
local official arbitrarily decide whether to grant a permit, police are arbitrarily de-
ciding whether protests deserve either a militarized or standardized response. Although
the Court later upheld public demonstration licenses in Cox v. New Hampshire,136
it did so only on the condition that objective criteria is used to determine who re-
ceives a license.137 Police departments can establish the same objective criteria that
the Court upheld in Cox, as exemplified by the Camden police force which has
initiated a new program of data collecting and community policing that attempts to
remove the pernicious mental shortcut that police officers sometimes create in cer-
tain communities.138
As outlined by the Framers and interpreted by the Court in the 1930s, the
Assembly Clause was designed to provide a peaceful avenue for citizens to reproach
majority opinion through public assemblies. President Abraham Lincoln once wrote
that “the right of peaceable assembly . . . is the Constitutional substitute for revolu-
tion.”139 Through public protests, even the most repressed group can be heard if it
133 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
134 Id. at 516.
135 Id. (arguing that the ordinance could “be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression
of free expression of views on national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will
undoubtedly ‘prevent’ such eventualities”).
136 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
137 Id. at 574–76.
138 Tanzina Vega, Is Camden a Model for the Future of Policing?, CNN POLITICS, http://
www.cnn.com/2015/06/27/politics/camden-police-technology/ [http://perma.cc/SC76-2FMX]
(last updated June 27, 2015, 11:11 AM) (discussing the city’s new data initiative and its
impact on the city’s crime rate).
139 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Alexander H. Stephens (Jan. 19, 1860), in UNCOLLECTED
LETTERS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 127 (Gilbert A. Tracy ed., 1917).
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creates enough of a disturbance. This allows a repressed group to air its grievances
without resorting to violence.
By reinvigorating the original jurisprudence behind the freedom of assembly,
protesters could seek constitutional protection from militarized police forces for two
different reasons. First, public protests serve a greater democratic purpose that is
inherent in the popular sovereignty of the First Amendment.140 Second, allowing
police forces to determine by themselves whether they arrive with militarized equip-
ment or with standard equipment is an arbitrary use of state action that violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.
If the Court interprets the Assembly Clause through originalism, protections for
protesters would return to the 1930s level when the Court struck down state action that
arbitrarily suppressed freedom of expression.141 As discussed in Part II.B, the ag-
gressive tactics taken by Ferguson police officers likely suppressed individuals’ right
to freely express their political thought through public protests.142 By reviving the
freedom of assembly as a fundamental right, the Court would apply strict scrutiny
to the presence of militarized police at public gatherings. This would provide a much
broader swath of constitutional protections to protesters.
B. Applying Speech Doctrine to Protest Cases
Even if the Court does not choose to reinvigorate the original interpretation of
the Assembly Clause, it can apply the existing free speech doctrine of the chilling
effect test to the militarized police response to public protests. Although physical
demonstrations are subject to greater state regulation than pure speech, the recent
phenomenon of police militarization and the erosion of the Posse Comitatus Act poses
a significant and new threat to the right to assemble.143 By applying existing free
speech doctrine, the Court could protect protesters from the threat of police militari-
zation without having to create new legal theories.144 As such, the Court should still
broaden the scope of the Assembly Clause, even if it chooses not to return the Clause
back to its 1930s interpretation.
140 Public assemblies and political societies “embod[y] an understanding of popular sover-
eignty and representation in which the role of the citizen [is] not limited to periodic voting,
but instead entail[s] active and constant engagement in political life.” Robert M. Chesney,
Democratic-Republican Societies, Subversion, and the Limits of Legitimate Political Dissent
in the Early Republic, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1525, 1539 (2004).
141 See supra notes 125–39 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 74–92 and accompanying text.
143 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965); Note, Regulation of Demonstrations,
supra note 94, at 319.
144 Although rare, there is precedent for the application of free speech doctrine to general
First Amendment cases. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (holding a law that required an addressee to affirmatively request delivery of
communist political propaganda unconstitutional because it would be certain to have a “de-
terrent effect”).
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In the past, the Court has found a number of government regulations and actions
unconstitutional solely based on their chilling effect on an individual’s exercise of
his First Amendment rights, even if the government action was not facially unconsti-
tutional itself.145 A chilling effect occurs “when individuals seeking to engage in
activity protected by the first amendment are deterred from so doing by governmen-
tal regulation not specifically directed at that protected activity.”146 Courts are
typically quite deferential to state actions, but they have been willing to grant exemp-
tions to otherwise constitutional laws if the plaintiff demonstrates that the regulation
severely burdens his freedom of expression.147 The Court uses a balancing test to
decide whether there has been a chilling effect.148 It weighs the substantiality of the
state interest against the severity of the deterrent effect.149 Originally, the Court only
struck down invidious state actions.150 Recently, however, the Court has recognized
the chilling effect doctrine as a cognizable constitutional claim, even in the absence
of targeted persecution.151
Given that the chilling effect doctrine is the direct product of the Court’s desire to
protect the communist and civil rights movements from governmental crackdown
during the 1950s McCarthyism Era,152 the Court should be willing to apply the doc-
trine to a similar governmental crackdown on modern-day protest movements.153 Public
protest, which falls under the freedom of assembly, is a First Amendment right, which
means that it is within the required protected class. To determine if an unconstitu-
tional chilling effect occurs when militarized police preemptively swarm a public
protest, the Court would weigh the deterrent effect—discussed in Part III154—against
the state interest of public safety.
Protecting public safety is a legitimate and strong state interest,155 and it is often
one of the major arguments offered by supporters of the utilization of militarized po-
lice at public protests.156 Although public safety is an extremely lofty state interest,
145 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (discussing prior cases where constitutional
violations may arise from deterrent effects).
146 Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling
Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978) (emphasis omitted).
147 See Monica Youn, The Chilling Effect and the Problem of Private Action, 66 VAND.
L. REV. 1473, 1484–85 (2013).
148 See id. at 1494.
149 See id.
150 See id. at 1491–92.
151 See id. at 1491.
152 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
153 See Youn, supra note 147, at 1486.
154 See supra notes 93–124 and accompanying text.
155 See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (recognizing a threat
to public safety as a legitimate government interest for regulating First Amendment rights).
156 See Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, supra note 94, at 320–22 (explaining that
protesters lose their constitutional protections if they become violent).
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a state would have to prove that there is a “clear and present danger” of violence at
the public protest in question.157 There would only be a “clear and present danger”
if the protest in question leads to “imminent lawless action.”158 Assessing whether
there is imminent lawless action is difficult with modern protests because the pres-
ence of militarized police often invites violence, not the other way around.
Given the freedom of assembly’s “preferred place” in our society, however,
“[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for per-
missible limitation.”159 As such, the chilling effect doctrine would, at the very least,
protect the preemptive presence of militarized police at public protests. SWAT
teams would no longer act as first responders to public demonstrations.
Some local police forces have already recognized that prematurely deploying
SWAT teams to public protests before there is imminent lawless action not only
constitutionally infringes upon protesters’ rights but does more harm than good. For
example, the New York City Police Commissioner announced that he plans on re-
organizing the NYPD’s special operations forces into two distinct teams: one for
terrorist events and another for protests.160 The terrorist team will continue to be
heavily armed, whereas the protest team will be trained in community policing.161
Until a constitutional standard is applied to all of America, however, local police
forces will still be able to intimidate protesters with the use of militarized police.
C. Switching the Burden
Finally, if the Court refuses to return the Assembly Clause back to its original
meaning or apply the chilling effect doctrine to the freedom of assembly, as it does
with the freedom of speech, the Court should apply the burden of peaceful assembly
to the state actor rather than the individual. Traditionally, the presence of the word
“peacefully” in the Assembly Clause acts as a limitation on the right to assemble;
the idea being that, if the people cannot protest peacefully, they do not have a right
to protest at all.162 There is, however, another interpretation of the word—where
157 The Court established the “clear and present danger” standard in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), to determine when a state may constitutionally restrict freedom
of speech. Id. at 52 (“The question . . . is whether the words used are used . . . as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent.” (emphasis added)).
158 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional guarantees
of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).
159 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
160 See J. David Goodman, Bratton Says Terrorism and Protests Will Be Handled by
Separate Police Units, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/03
/nyregion/bratton-says-terrorism-and-protests-will-be-handled-by-separate-police-units.html.
161 See id.
162 See Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, supra note 94, at 320–22.
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“peacefully” actually acts as a guarantee of the right, not a limit.163 In this interpreta-
tion, individuals have a right to assemble free from any external interference.164
With this interpretation, the acts of the militarized police in Ferguson were
clearly a constitutional violation because police presence was actually interfering
with their right to protest. Switching the burden in this way would place an infringe-
ment on the police, not on the protesters—the way the Framers wanted it.
In De Jonge, the Court took small steps toward switching the standard when
Chief Justice Hughes wrote that “the constitutional rights of free speech, free press
and free assembly” are needed to ensure that “changes, if desired, may be obtained
by peaceful means.”165 The Court believed that the Tree of Liberty did not need to be
refreshed “with the blood of patriots & tyrants,” but instead hoped that public polit-
ical assemblies, where dissidents could freely voice their opinions, would protect our
democratic society.166
Although the Court did not expand upon this standard in the 1930s, it should do so
now, given the new wave of police militarization and its effect on public protests. With
a simple shift in the burden of who is responsible for the peace—the police or the
protesters—state officials would be forced to think twice when deploying militarized
police to protests. If the state were held responsible for inciting violence, it would likely
eliminate the premature presence of militarized police at public demonstrations.
Using Ferguson as a case study, it is clear that the government was not focused
on protecting the rights of the protesters.167 Instead, by sending in militarized police
to oversee the protests, the city of Ferguson was ensuring that the protests were not
peaceful.168 To inject military-style police officers into an emotional situation where
individuals are protesting police hostility is just asking for violence.169 The state should
still have the ability to regulate the right to assemble if there are legitimate public safety
concerns, but the regulation must be in reaction to a developing violent protest.
Finally, the idea of switching the burden of maintaining a peaceful assembly to
the police is not completely novel. In the 1930s when the Assembly Clause received
more press attention,170 the American Bar Association suggested in an amicus brief
163 See Brod, supra note 93, at 167–69.
164 See id.
165 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
166 This is a reference to Thomas Jefferson’s famous quote: “[T]he tree of liberty must be
refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots & tyrants.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to William Smith (Nov. 13, 1787) (on file with the Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov
/exhibits/jefferson/105.html [http://perma.cc/H278-U6KE]).
167 See DOJ REPORT, supra note 59, at 53–59.
168 See id. at 53–55, 59.
169 See id.
170 Until World War II, the freedom of assembly was a cornerstone of American consti-
tutional landscape. It was even chosen as one of the “Four Freedoms” at the New York
World’s Fair. See Inazu, supra note 93, at 601. Dorothy Thompson, the “First Lady of
American Journalism,” called the freedom of assembly “the most essential right of the four,”
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that the duty should be put on the public officials to ensure that “the right of free
assembly prevail[s] over the forces of disorder if by any reasonable effort or means
they can possibly do so.”171 The New York Times lauded this brief “as a landmark in
American legal history” and encouraged police stations to read it and adopt its advice.172
CONCLUSION
Although Representative Sedgwick argued in 1789 that the right to assemble “is
certainly a thing that never would be called in question,” the events of recent social pro-
tests have certainly done just that.173 For many of those who hold minority opinions,
protests are the most effective way to challenge the status quo.174 Police militarization,
however, is making it much more costly for citizens to exercise their constitutional
rights. In today’s world, activists have a choice between either sitting at home wishing
they could protest or protesting with the potential police use of military weaponry.
They are thus forced to play a zero-sum game.
Because the current interpretation of the Assembly Clause does not protect what
the Founding Fathers originally envisioned with the First Amendment, there is no
constitutional protection against this chilling effect on the right to assemble.175
Current interpretation has made the right to assemble a secondary right, a lesser
right, to that of speech and association.176 The original intent of the Assembly Clause
was to protect in-person meetings.177 The Framers enunciated a right that would
protect peaceful assemblies and protests178—a way for minorities to draw attention
to their causes. This right has all but disappeared in modern jurisprudence.
For the last thirty years, the Court has been able to get away with reclassifying
freedom of expression cases as freedom of association or speech cases without any
real repercussions.179 But the erosion of the Posse Comitatus Act, the increasing
because “[t]he right to meet together for one purpose or another is actually the guaranty of
the three other rights.” See id. at 601–02.
171 Id. at 600 (quoting Brief for the Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar As-
sociation as Amicus Curiae, Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (No. 651)).
172 Id. (quoting Editorial, A Brief for Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1938, at 18).
173 Linnekin, supra note 101, at 611 (quoting CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCU-
MENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 159 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991)).
174 If the citizens of Ferguson had not protested, Michael Brown’s death probably would
not have made national news, and the resulting national conversation about police shootings
of black males likely would not have occurred. See generally Emanuella Grinberg, Why
‘Hands Up, Don’t Shoot’ Resonates Regardless of Evidence, CNN, http://www.cnn.com
/2015/01/10/us/ferguson-evidence-hands-up/ [http://perma.cc/EP8L-Y3F4] (last updated Jan. 11,
2015, 9:43 AM) (detailing how “hands up, don’t shoot” has become a nationwide protest symbol
for police mistreatment of minorities).
175 See supra Part III.
176 See supra Part III.
177 See supra Part III.
178 See HAMILTON, supra note 103, at 55–56; ZICK, supra note 85, at 27.
179 See Brod, supra note 93, at 160.
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extent of police militarization, and the large-scale return of political protests have left
a serious breach of constitutional protections. By whittling away the freedom of assem-
bly jurisprudence, the Court has left activists defenseless. The effects of police mili-
tarization on public protests are especially concerning for two reasons: (1) spontaneous
political demonstrations are typically the result of dissident social movements, which
should be protected;180 and (2) Congress specifically passed the Posse Comitatus Act
to protect citizens from the inherent threat of a domestic military force.181
This Note argues that reinvigorating the often forgotten right to assemble would
be a constitutionally sound avenue to protect one of the most important features of
society—political discourse in the form of protest—by reining in the negative effects
of police militarization on public demonstrators. The Court can reinvigorate the free-
dom of assembly in three different ways. First, it could simply return to 1930s juris-
prudence, which grounded its interpretation in originalism.182 Second, it could apply
the chilling effect doctrine to prevent state actors from making aggressive decisions
when the right to assemble is at risk.183 Finally, it could place the burden on the state
to ensure that the protesters may peacefully exercise their First Amendment right to
assemble peacefully.184 All three solutions would ensure that all citizens, no matter
his or her place in society, are free to join together in an extemporaneous demonstra-
tion and voice their opinions on real-time events.
After all, one of the most iconic images of the twentieth century is a picture
taken on the morning of the Tiananmen Square protest—a lone man standing in front
of a column of tanks. If the Court does not protect the right to protest against police
militarization, how long will it be before there is a column of tanks rolling towards
a lone man in the United States?
180 See supra Part III.
181 See supra Part I.A.
182 See supra Part IV.A.
183 See supra Part IV.B.
184 See supra Part IV.C.
